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1 General Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The chapters of this dissertation discuss two di¤erent modelling variants in game theory and
industrial economics: The rst being asymmetric information (chapters 2 and 4) and the second
being vertical relations (chapters 3 and 4). The chapters dealing with asymmetric information
introduce di¤erent types of signalling models. In chapter 2 a model is presented, where an informed
seller might inuence the belief of uninformed buyers about him being a good or a bad type. In
chapter 4 a supplier can signal his information about market demand to a retailer, but has to make
sure that the signalled information is credible. The two chapters, which treat models with vertical
relations, involve intricate contracts between up- and downstream rms. In chapter 3 suppliers can
decide to supply one of two intermediaries, with the contracts o¤ered by the intermediaries being
conditional on the prots made in the downstream market. In chapter 4 the upstream monopoly
can use two-part tari¤s to avoid the problem of double marginalization (see Spengler, 1950), when
contracting with a single downstream rm.
Asymmetric information and vertical relations apply to di¤erent aspects of a model: its infor-
mation structure and its interaction structure respectively. However, both modelling variants are
increasing the complexity of the model, to which they are applied. If, in general, models are sim-
plications of reality, i.e., reductions of the complexity of the latter, both these modelling variants
can be regarded as bringing a model a bit closer to reality by increasing its complexity. Con-
sidering any form of transaction it seems highly unlikely that all parties involved share the same
set of relevant information and modern supply chains consist of way more layers than just output
producing rms and consumers. Unfortunately the increase in complexity comes at the price of
reduced tractability. Thus, general statements about a models behavior can often only be made
on a very fundamental level, while assumptions on functional forms or even parameters have to be
made to shed light on the properties of the model. Still, comparative statics o¤er a possibility to
analyze a model beyond specic parameter constellations, while attention is restricted to specic
equilibria (or types thereof) in order to keep the models somewhat tractable.
In this dissertation, the primary interest is a methodological one: to understand how the
modelsdynamics as well as the implications concerning e¢ ciency di¤er, if certain assumptions or
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parameters change. While the results of the other chapters still require their application in order to
lead to prolic policy advice, in chapter 3 an implication for economic policy is already mentioned.
1.2 Methodological Discussion
The models, which are discussed in this dissertation, employ solution concepts from non-cooperative
game theory. The models, which treat aspects of asymmetric information (chapters 2 and 4), use
the concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (see Harsanyi, 1967) and backward induction (see
Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) to nd subgame perfect equilibria (see Selten, 1978). In
contrast, the model in chapter 3 is nested in a full information setting, which allows to solely use
subgame perfection as a solution criterion.
In chapter 2, the model consists of a simple dynamic stage game, which is repeated a nite
number of times. The agentsaction spaces are fairly limited, while the information dynamic is
quite complex, allowing the involved parties to learn along the equilibrium path. Counterfactuals
and working hypotheses are used to show that a specic route through the supergames game tree
may be part of an equilibrium. The product, which is traded in this model is an experience good
with buyers learning their utility after consumption. However, they can form an expectation about
their utility from the sellers reputation for being a "good" or a "bad" type. While consumers would
always want to buy from a good seller, they would never want to buy from a bad seller. Although
the reputation stochastically depends upon the sellers e¤ort, there is still some uncertainty about
it from the sellers perspective, as she cannot directly observe, whether a buyer actually liked the
product or not. The seller is only able to form a believe about that, while the buyers know whether
previous buyers liked the product. Thus, the model presents uncertainty in a couple of dimensions:
a) for the buyers the sellers type and the sellers e¤ort choice, b) for the seller the buyers utility
from interaction and the sellers reputation. Therefore, while the stage game being structurally
very simple, the dynamic generated by the information structure restricts the analysis to focus on
a specic type of equilibrium, in contrast to solving the game entirely. However, in each of the
sellers decision nodes an expected continuation value of each respective action can be computed
in order to allow the seller to decide upon her e¤ort. Thus, in an innitely repeated game the
sellers decision problem could be solved as a stochastic dynamic programming problem with her
e¤ort choice as the control and her expected reputation as the state variable. While the dynamic
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programming framework is retained, the equilibrium is analyzed by using backward induction, as
the e¤ect can be discussed more concisely in a nitely repeated game.
Chapter 3 presents the only full information model, which is analyzed by using backward in-
duction. However, as the market structure involves multiple rms at each end of the supply chain,
the possibilities for interaction are a lot richer compared to the models in the other chapters. Fur-
thermore, this model includes di¤erent rm types on the downstream level in the sense that their
objective functions di¤er. The downstream rms may be "regular" investor-owned rms, which
maximize their prots and have to acquire an input good (or production capacity) from suppliers.
However, the suppliers might also join a cooperative, which maximizes its membersprots. Af-
ter suppliers have made their decisions, downstream rms compete by choosing quantities to be
supplied on a homogenous product market, given their capacity constraints. The need to acquire
production capacity links this model to the literature on limited capacity Duopoly models, but
unlike in the classical Bertrand models of Levitan and Shubik (1970) and Kreps and Scheinkmann
(1983) rms in our model can not freely choose to acquire capacity as they wish in a stage previous
to Cournot competition. Instead, there is a limited number of suppliers, i.e., a limited amount of
capacity, available to be contracted. Therefore, in our model rms may have incentives to increase
their own capacity beyond what they actually desire to provide to consumers, in order to reduce
the capacity available to their competitor. We vary the number of allocatable suppliers in order to
indentify di¤erent endogenously formed market structures on the downstream part of the supply
chain.
In chapter 4, the model combines asymmetric information and vertical relations, analyzing a
supply chain with a single supplier and a single retailer as well as uncertainty about consumer
demand on a perfectly competitive market. The information asymmetry stems from the agents
signal about the state of demand being private information. Thus, the model is again solved for
a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, also employing the intuitive criterion (see Cho and Kreps, 1987)
to reduce the number of potential equilibria by restricting o¤-equilibrium beliefs. The upstream
rm (supplier) o¤ers a menu of contracts to the downstream rm (retailer) with each contract
specifying a combination of a quantity to be sold to consumers and a transfer to the supplier. The
contracts may depend on the suppliers private signal about the state of demand. Additionally, the
agents are able to decide upon the precision of their private signals, given the technical limitations
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to resolve the uncertainty. Varying this technical limitation allows to generate di¤erent types of
equilibria with the seller choosing to have the private signal either as precise or as imprecise as
possible.
Two of the models discussed in this dissertation present di¤erent types of asymmetric informa-
tion (uncertainty about types of players in chapter 2 and states of nature in chapter 4 respectively).
Despite that both models can be regarded as signalling models (see Spence, 1973). In chapter 2
the seller can signal her type by choosing actions, which allow buyers to better di¤erentiate her
from the other type. In chapter 4 the supplier may choose to o¤er contracts, which credibly signal
the private information she has about the state of demand to the retailer. However, the supplier
may also decide to be completely uninformed, which leads her to o¤er pooling contracts.
Two models also represent di¤erent types of vertical structures (downstream oligopoly with
Cournot competition in chapter 3 and a single supplier/retailer relation with perfect downstream
competition in chapter 4 respectively). However, both models deal with supplier/intermediary
relations and allow for conditional contracts. As already mentioned, the contracts may depend on
the suppliers private information in chapter 4, but in addition a menu of contracts for the di¤erent
realizations of the retailers signal is o¤ered. The contracts between up- and downstream rms in
chapter 3 may depend on the prots made by the downstream rms in the Cournot competition.
The models also di¤er in that in chapter 3 the downstream rms make take it or leave it o¤ers to
the suppliers, while in chapter 4, the supplier designs the menu of contracts.
1.3 Main results
In chapter 2 a model is discussed where several short-run players (buyers) decide sequentially
whether or not to interact with a long-run player (seller), who can choose her e¤ort in order to
increase the probability to provide a satisfying product to the buyers. As mentioned, whether the
product has been satisfying inuences the long-run players reputation for being a "good" or a
"bad" type. The reputation then determines whether future short-run players want to buy the
product. A common feature of such games is, that if one of the short-run players decides not to
interact, all remaining ones will do so as well, as they are in an informational equivalent situation
concerning the sellers reputation. In such a game the buyers, despite being myopic and therefore
not able to coordinate, are able to excercise pressure on the seller to maintain a high e¤ort, in
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order to prevent her reputation from turning bad. It is indicated in an example that this does
not necessarily hold, if the long-run players action set is su¢ ciently rich. Although information
transmission on one side of the market stops, the refusal to interact by the short-run players
may be informative for the long-run player. This can change the long-run players behavior on
the equilibrium path in such a way that short-run players again consider it favorable to interact.
Thus, the severe grim-trigger like punishment (see Friedman, 1971) by the short-run players due
to the long-run players bad reputation does not necessarily occur.
In chapter 3, which is a joint work with Vanessa von Schlippenbach, we analyze a vertical
structure, in which intermediaries have to acquire an input from an exogenously given number of
suppliers. The intermediaries then choose the quantities of a homogenous product to be sold to
consumers. We nd that in case one of the intermediaries is organized as a cooperative the cost
of the input increases, leading to ine¢ ciently low supply to consumers. The downstream supply
may be even lower than in case a regular monopoly is the markets sole intermediary. For suppliers
the average prot is of course higher, if one of the intermediary rms is a cooperative. Thus, we
can conrm the competitive yardstick e¤ect of cooperatives that they improve the transfers paid
to suppliers (see Rogers and Petraglia, 1994 or Hanisch et al., 2013), but show that in our model
it comes at the expense of consumer surplus. Furthermore, we can show that a cooperative (or
an identically acting investor-owend rm) may be a monopoly in the downstream market, if the
upstream production capacity is su¢ ciently small, whereas we get a Cournot duopoly with one
rm maximizing its prot and one rm maximizing average prot, if upstream capacity is large.
In any case supply to consumers is equal or smaller than if both intermediaries are regular prot
maximizing rms. However, if upstream capacity is very small, it may be more e¢ cient to have
a cooperative downstream, as the resulting monopoly incurs less cost than the duopoly of two
investor-owned rms, but produces the same output.
In chapter 4, which is a joint work with Pio Baake and Friederike Heiny, we analyze a simple
supply chain with one supplier, one retailer and uncertainty about market demand. Focusing on the
incentives of the supplier and the retailer to enhance their private information about the actual
market conditions, we show that choices on information acquisition are strategic complements.
While the retailers incentives are mainly driven by the information rent that she can earn, the
supplier will choose to acquire information only, if the retailer is rather well informed, even though
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the information is free of charge. The reason is that, if the supplier receives a signal of a high
state of demand and wants to appropriate some of the resulting information rent, the contracts,
which she o¤ers to the retailer, need to credibly signal the private information. This credibility
can be achieved by reducing the quantity o¤ered to a retailer with a signal for low demand,
which is rather unlikely, if the supplier herself has received a "high signal". Thus, if the technical
limitation on the precision of the signals is such that being informed does not reduce enough
uncertainty, the potential information rent is small and the supplier may choose to stay uninformed
in the rst place and avoid the credibility problem by o¤ering pooling contracts. This means that
regardless, whether the supplier received a high or a low signal, the supplied quantity as well as
the corresponding transfer are the same. If the agents can choose to be fully informed, the supplier
will do so and extract all rent from the retailer. However, there is still some distortion required
on the quantity for a retailer with a low signal, as the retailer might not be fully informed as
well and thus the credibility problem may still be binding. If the technical limitation is such that
full information is not possible, we get either the described pooling equilibrium or an equilibrium,
where both agents decide almost always to be informed as much as possible. The latter type
of equilibrium exists, if the maximum signal precision is su¢ ciently high, which means that the
information rent, which can be gained by choosing a high signal precision, is high as well.
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2 Information Asymmetry and Reentry
2.1 Introduction
This chapter analyzes an example of a repeated game in which players decide upon participation
in an experience goods market. It is shown that although participation stops, it may start again
at a later point in time.
The model presented here involves a series of short-run players, who each decide once in an
exogenously given sequence whether or not to interact with a single long-run player. There is
uncertainty about the long-run players type, linking the model to incomplete information models
like discussed in Harsanyi (1967). The short-run players might be able to acquire some information
about the long-run player by observing signals, which are due to past interactions. This puts the
model at hand in line with reputation models like the ones of Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom
and Roberts (1982). Although their models include di¤erent stage games in fashion of the chain-
store game in Selten (1978), the way in which reputation is formed is similar in the present model.
A feature of equilibrium behavior in similar models is that once a short-run player refuses to
participate, all subsequent short-run players will do so as well.1 This happens as the refute to
interact prevents the accumulation of additional information about the long-run player. In turn,
this leads to grim-trigger like behavior, although short-run players are myopic and therefore would
not be able to coordinate on such a strategy as a strategic punishment. Moreover, it gives the
long-run player an incentive to invest highly in achieving signals, which induce short-run players
to participate, as punishment can be pretty severe.
Similar to Ely and Välimäki (2003) the information, which is relevant to short-run players in
order to decide upon participation, is the type of long-run player they are facing. In contrast
to their paper our model does not allow the preferable type to identify as such as we assume
imperfectly observed actions. Therefore, our model is close to the one in Fudenberg and Levine
(1992), which also uses a similar stage game. But while their paper focuses on the payo¤bounds for
the long-run player, the model at hand rather stresses on the mechanic of information transmission
and its implication for equilibrium behavior.2
1See for instance Ely and Välimäki (2003) or the examples in Fudenberg and Levine (1989).
2The main di¤erence in modeling assumptions is that we assume the long-run player to infer the signals, which
short-run players received in the past, from the short-run players behavior, while Fudenberg and Levine (1992)
assumes signals to be public information.
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The main argument illustrated in this chapter is that even though the information transmission
between short-run players may stop, non-participation might convey information for the long-run
player. This may alter the long-run players behavior and in turn lead short-run players to interact
again, although they have the same belief about the long-run players type as the short-run player,
who chose not to participate.
The next section introduces a model for a game, in which reentry can happen in equilibrium. In
section 2.3, it is illustrated that if the number of feasible actions for the preferable type of long-run
player is su¢ ciently large, reentry can be part of an equilibrium. The last section of this chapter
wraps up the discussion and introduces possible extensions.
2.2 Model
Let us consider a 4 period model with a long-run player L and a short-run player si for each period,
with i 2 f1:::4g3 . The long-run player is one of two types 
 = f!; !g.
Starting with s1 each short-run player and the long-run player play the following stage game:
Actions: First si chooses whether to participate or not, which is denoted by ai 2 A = fin; out).
If ai = in, L chooses an unobservable e¤ort level ei 2 E = fe; eg and therefore incurs a cost
C(e) = 0; C(e) = c; c > 0. Then, each short-run player receives a benet qi 2 Q = fq; qg with
q = 1 and q =  1. The probabilities for realizing q are
Pr(qj e; !) = Pr(qj e; !) = 
Pr(qj e; !) = 
Pr(qj e; !) = 
Furthermore, 1 >    > 12 >  > 0.4 The assumption    > 12 makes it desirable to choose in,
if L is ! regardless of the chosen e¤ort. On the other hand, 12 >  makes it undesirable to interact
with a long-run player of type !. If ai = out, qi = 0 with certainty and the period ends. Figure
2.1 shows the game tree for the stage game for a given type of long-run player.
Beliefs: Short-run players do not know, which type of long-run player they are actually facing.
3While the intuition behind the mechanic is similar for i 2 f1:::1g, the formal arguments are much easier to
illustrate in the nite case with 4 being the minimum number of periods for the mechanic to work.
4Assuming all probabilities to be strictly less than 1 and greater than 0, does not allow any sequence of signal
realizations to fully reveal the long-run players type.
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Figure 2.1: Game tree for the repeated stage game.
There exists a commonly known prior 0 2 (0; 1) that the long-run player is the ! type. Probability
i denotes player sis belief and 8i > 0; i is a Bayesianupdate of 0, given the observed sequence
(q1;:::;qi 1). This signals are not observable for L.5 Therefore, the long-run player only has an
expectation about i which is denoted by %i = E(ij %i 1; ai; ei 1). The long-run player needs this
expectation in order to assess the expected value of choosing either e or e at each decision node.
Given %i 1
6 , ei 1 leads to a distribution over qi 1, which in turn can be used to derive an expected
value for %i. Short-run player is actual decision ai allows for an update of this expectation.
Payo¤s: The long-run player has a discount factor of . Stage game payo¤s are assumed as
follows:
For player si : ui =
8><>: qi, if ai = in0, otherwise
For player L : i =
8>>>><>>>>:
1, if ai = in and ei = e
1  c, if ai = in and ei = e
0, otherwise
At each of the long-run players decision nodes a game has a continuation value Vi(%i; ei; !), which
is the sum of discounted expected payo¤s over all future periods, given the long-run players type,
5While the e¤ect is easier to show under this strong assumption, it is su¢ cient to assume that L cannot perfectly
observe the signals.
6Note that as the short-run playersprior 0 is common knowledge, it holds that %0 = 0.
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the respective e¤ort and expectation about the short-run playersbeliefs.
With the assumption that all players maximize their expected utility at each decision node, we
turn to the equilibrium behavior.
2.3 Equilibrium and reentry
In equilibrium short-run players and both types of the long-run player optimize:
ai =
8><>: in, if  i  0out, otherwise (2.1)
ei = argmaxVi(%i; ei; !)
 i denotes the expected payo¤ for short-run player i, when choosing ai = in. Thus, simplifying
(2.1) leads to the following conditions for all L types and all si:
8i : argmaxVi(%i; ei; !) = e (2.2)
Furthermore, ! chooses e if:
Vi+1(%i+1(%i; e; !); e

i+1(%i; e; !); !) (2.3)
 Vi+1(%i+1(%i; e; !); ei+1(%i; e; !); !)
and si chooses ai = in, if:
i+ (1  i) Pr(qj ei; !) >
1
2
(2.4)
Lemma 2.1 In any equilibrium agents behave according to equations (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4).
It is straightforward to see that the strategies depicted in (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4) solve the
respective agents maximization problem for given beliefs. Further, as i is a Bayesianupdate of
0, beliefs are consistent with equilibrium behavior. No o¤-equilibrium beliefs can be specied as
o¤-equilibrium behavior cannot be detected.
We derive equilibrium conditions the following way.
(2.2): As choosing e is costly, but the ! type does not benet from it, as it leads to the very same
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distribution over outcomes as e, it is obvious that in equilibrium ! will play e in all periods.7
(2.3): The ! type of long-run player faces a dynamic programming problem with the state variable
%i+1 and control variable ei and chooses e, when the following condition is met:
Vi+1(e

i+1(%i+1; a

i+1

qi=q
; e); ) + (1  )Vi+1(ei+1(%i+1; ai+1

qi=q
; e); )  c

 Vi+1(ei+1(%i+1; ai+1

qi=q
; e); )) + (1  )Vi+1(ei+1(%i+1; ai+1

qi=q
; e); ))
with (2.3) being a shorter notation for the same condition.
(2.4): Now, the expected benet for si can be written as
 i = i
X
q
Pr(qij e; !)qi + (1  i)
X
q
Pr(qij ei ; !)qi
Combining this with (2.1) leads si to choose ai = in, if (2.4) holds.
Hence, we get the condition on i for participation:
ai = inj ei = e , if i <  =
2   1
2(   ) (2.5)
ai = inj ei = e , if i <  =
2   1
2(   )
This means that if i <  (

i >  ), si will choose to participate (not to participate), regardless
of ei .
First, we indicate that reentry cannot happen, if ! has only one action available or, which is
equivalent in our model, if  = , as qi is then independent of ei.
Corollary 2.1 Consider the game described above. Then, if  =  and for any i : ai = out,
aj = out;8j > i.
As the long-run player cannot improve the probability of producing q, it cannot be the case
that once  i < 0,  j  0 for any j > i as  i =  j for any ei and ej .
Now, if !s feasible actions lead to di¤erent, but strictly positive expected utilities for the
short-run players, reentry can be part of an equilibrium. Therefore, we now assume that  > .
7Thus, for the remainder of this section, payo¤s, actions and strategies will refer to the ! type of long-run player,
unless noted otherwise.
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Proposition 2.1 Consider the game described above. Then, there exist technology parameters ,
 and  with  >  and a cost parameter c such that a2 = out ^ a3 = in for some history of the
game.
Proof. See Appendix.
For the intuition behind the possibility of reentry let us assume the following history:
a1 = in, e

1 = e, 

1 = 0 < 
a2 = out, 

2 2 (; ]
a3 = in, e

3 = e, 

3 = 

2
a4 2 fin; outg, e4 = e; 4 2 (0; 1)
To get the game started, we assume 0 < . Let us further assume that q1 = q. This would lead
s2 to choose a2 = out , if e

2 conditional on a

2 = in would be e. If a

2 = out, the long-run player
learns that q1 = q, knowing she has to achieve q now, in order to make any prots in future.8 This
disciplines L to choose the high e¤ort level in period 3 and makes this choice credible for short-run
players. Therefore s3 chooses to participate, despite sharing s2s belief about the long-run player.
Now, if the second short-run player did participate, the long-run player might have reason to think
that q1 = q.9 This in turn makes it unfavorable for s2 to participate as 2 2 (; ] due to q1 = q.
This example shows that it only needs little di¤erences in the model assumptions in order to
make reentry possible on the equilibrium path. This has a couple of implications for optimal e¤ort
investment, which are at the moment left for future research as it would need a di¤erent model
in order to derive a benchmark scenario. However, it can be expected that it will lead to a lower
average e¤ort than in case reentry is not possible.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, the aspect of the model, which is driving the mechanic, is the information structure,
which allows both sides of the market to learn about each other along the equilibrium path. The
short-run players are able to learn about the long-run players type and the long-run player is able
8Assume for instance that i >  as soon as q has been realized twice.
9Remember that conditional on a2 = in, e

2 = e which makes it optimal to choose a

2 = in only for a short-run
player, who received signal q1 = q.
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to learn about short-run playersbeliefs about the long-run players type. Crucial for reentry, at
least in the present model, is that short-run playersdecisions are informative about past signal
realizations. A condition used above is that the long-run player needs to be able to increase the
e¤ort, once a short-run player refused to participate. Furthermore, this increase in e¤ort has to
be optimal along the equilibrium path, in order to be credible to short-run players and thereby
induce reentry.
Possible applications include not only settings like the experience goods market in the example,
but any kind of principal-agent model, satisfying a minimum degree of asymmetric information,
which is yet to be specied.10
10For an assessment of di¢ culties in reputation games dealing with the classical principal-agent structure of two
long-run players interacting repeatedly, see Mailath (2007). Celentani et al. (1996) introduces a model dealing with
such a situation.
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2.5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1. As noted in section 2.3, histories consistent with the proposition are
as follows:
a1 = in, e

1 2 fe; eg, 1 = 0 < 
a2 = out, 

2 2 (; ]
a3 = in, e

3 = e, 

3 = 

2
a4 2 fin; outg, e4 = e; 4 2 (0; 1)
Furthermore, assume the following beliefs:
0   (2.6)
2(0; (q; e)) > 
2(0; (q; e))  
3(0; (q; e); (q; e))  
4(0; (q; e); (q; e))  
4(0; (q; e); (q; e); (q; e))  
4(0; (q; e); (q; e); (q; e)) > 
Let us start in i = 4 with backward induction.
In period 4 ! will choose e4 = e. Thus s4 will only choose a

4 = in, if 

4  . As a working
hypothesis let us assume that the long-run player is able to infer q1 from s2s behavior in the
following way:
q1 = q, if a2 = in (2.7)
q1 = q, if a2 = out
Regarding period 3, if q1 = q the long-run player knows that s3s behavior is uninformative about
q2, as 3(0; (q; e1); (q2; e2))  ;8q2 2 fq; qg and e1; e2 2 fe; eg. This leads to the following
16
comparison for the expected realization of q2:
if e3 = e : V3 = 2 + (1  2)
if e3 = e : V3 = 2 + (1  2)   c
Note that 2 = Pr(q j e2; !). This leads to e3 = e, if:
c  (1  2)(   ) (2.8)
Now in contrast, if q1 = q, a2 = out and hence, q2 = 0. Therefore, L knows that the payo¤ from
period 4 will only be positive, if q3 = q. Hence, the comparison in period 3, if q1 = q, is  versus
   c. This leads to e3 = e if:
c  (   ) (2.9)
Let us turn to i = 2. According to (2.7), L assumes that if a2 = in, q1 = q. Hence, conditional on
a2 = in, ! compares:
if e2 = e : V2 = ( + 
2) + (1  )( + 32)
if e2 = e : V2 = ( + 
2) + (1  )( + 32)  c
Note again 3 = Pr(q j e3; !). This leads to choosing e2 = e, if:
c  (1  3)(   )2 (2.10)
If (2.10) does not hold, e2 = e. Then (2.7) is conrmed as 2(0; q1 = q) 2 (; );8e1. Moreover,
one can see from (2.9) and (2.10) that it is possible to nd a c, which leads (2.9) and :(2.10) to
hold. Thereby, as (2.9) leads to a3 = in and :(2.10) leads to a2 = out, if q1 = q, reentry can
happen in equilibrium.
What is left to be proved, is that technology parameters ,  and  can be found such that the
sequence of Bayesian updated beliefs in (2.6) exists. Updates are derived for example as
2(0; (q; e)) =
0
0+ (1  0)
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If the system of Bayesian updates in (2.6) is computed for instance with the parametrization
 = 0:3,  = 0:6,  = 0:7, the system is satised for 0 2 (0:246; 0:3]. That equilibrium beliefs are
consistent with short-run playersequilibrium behavior can be easily seen from (2.1).
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3 Mixed Oligopoly in Vertical Relations: Cooperatives vs.
Investor-Owned Firms
3.1 Introduction
In recent years there has been increasing awareness of the problems caused by buyer power in
agricultural markets. As a remedy to the issues brought up by market dominating intermediaries,
the organization of primary producers in cooperatives has been advocated by political institutions
(see the EU milk package in Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013, as well as Regulation (EU) No
261/2012). In addition, there are exemptions from competition law to cooperatives11 in order to
promote their formation and allow primary producers to improve their bargaining position vis-à-vis
large intermediaries.
The following analysis wants to add to the discussion about cooperatives by not only looking
at the relationship of intermediaries and suppliers, but by including the e¤ects the presence of a
supplier-cooperative in a certain market may have on consumers.
Cooperatives, while often not market dominating corporate organizations, are present in a
wide range of di¤erent types of industries. Farmer-owned cooperatives play an important role in
agriculture around the world. But also in other sectors rms have created cooperatives like for
instance the Visa credit card network, which is collectively owned by its franchisee banks. Likewise,
collective ownership of a franchisor by its franchisees such as for hardware and trucking rms (see
Hansmann, 1996) is quite common. One of the main arguments for the advocacy of cooperatives
is the competitive yardstick e¤ect, which holds that the presence of cooperatives in the market
forces investor-owned rms to o¤er higher procurement prices for suppliersproducts. Empirical
support for the competitive yardstick e¤ect has been observed in the food manufacturing industry
in the US (see Rogers and Petraglia, 1994), the wheat market in Canada (see Zhang et al., 2007),
the co¤ee market in Chiapas, Mexico (see Milford, 2012), and the European dairy industry (see
Hanisch et al., 2013).
The model in this chapter reproduces the competitive yardstick e¤ect of cooperatives to improve
the procurement prices received by suppliers. However, it also shows that this improvement for
11For Germany see for instance §28 of the GWB (Gesetz gegen Wettbewebersbeschränkungen: Act Against
Restraints of Competition).
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suppliers may come at a cost for consumers. In our model higher procurement prices lead to a
decrease in the quantities supplied to consumers.
We analyze a situation, in which suppliers of primary products can either join a cooperative or
decide to o¤er their input production capacity to a regular prot maximizing, i.e., investor-owned
rm (IOF).12 Thus, the cooperative competes with the prot maximizing rm not only in the
nal goods market like the one for dairy products, but they also receive their input goods, e.g.,
raw milk, from the same pool of suppliers. Thus, regarded as a vertical relation with suppliers
on top, nal goods producers in the middle and demand at the bottom, we can model the middle
or intermediary section of these markets as a mixed oligopoly with Bertrand competition towards
the top and Cournot competition towards the bottom. For comparison a scenario is analyzed, in
which two IOFs compete for the supply of the primary good and the demand in the nal goods
market.
Furthermore, we discuss how the scarcity of production capacity determines its distribution
among intermediaries and the payments received by suppliers. As mentioned above, we also look
at the e¤ect of a cooperative on the provision of the nal good. We can show that the possibility to
join a cooperative disregarding whether the cooperative is active or not acts as a rent shifting
mechanism from the prot maximizing rms and consumers to the primary producers. Actually,
provision of the nal good may be higher, if there is only a monopoly IOF without the threat of
suppliers joining a cooperative, than in case both types of rms may be active.
In our model, a cooperative is assumed to share its prots equally among its members, i.e.,
the suppliers, while the IOF can choose to pay a transfer to its suppliers, which maximizes its
prot.13 However, the IOF can not always benet from the possibility to choose its transfer. As
the cooperative is assumed to maximize the suppliersprot and pays all its prot to the suppliers,
the IOF can only compete for capacity, if it does so as well. Thus, whenever capacity is so scarce
that one of the intermediaries would want to acquire all available capacity, either intermediary
may become a monopoly by shifting the downstream monopoly prot to the suppliers. The IOF
is only able to acquire production capacity, either if in case capacity is scarce it mimics the
12Whether the suppliersgood is an input good, which is processed by another rm, or already a nal good, which
is only distributed by an intermediary, does not make a di¤erence in our model. Hence, we use the terms input and
capacity interchangeably.
13The respective sector inquiry of the German Bundeskartellamt (Bundekartellamt 2012) indicates that these
di¤erent payment models between intermediaries and suppliers are present for instance in the German milk and
dairy sector.
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cooperative, or if in case capacity is abundant it takes, whatever the cooperative does not want
to acquire.
Although a frequent recommendation to suppliers to improve their bargaining position against
large intermediaries, cooperatives have a rather mixed standing in the economics literature. One of
the main arguments holds that cooperatives often have problems to act e¢ ciently (see the literature
following Porter and Scully, 1987 or Hansmann, 1988 and 1996). These ine¢ ciencies are often due
to members of a cooperative having lower incentives to reduce their individual output, when facing
Cournot competition. The members do not internalize the cost imposed on other members, when
total output is increased. A cooperative may still be able to benet its members compared to
supplying an IOF, as the cooperatives membersoverproduction serves as a commitment device
to supply a high quantity in Cournot competition (see Albaek and Schultz, 1998). In markets
with uncertainty about the quality of the primary good, a cooperatives revenue pooling may also
insure members against risks of quality realization (see Saitone and Sexton, 2009), which is a major
concern in agricultural production especially among small scale farmers. However, Pennerstorfer
and Weiss (2012) show that in terms of quality cooperatives may also fare badly compared to an
IOF as cooperative members tend to freeride on other members investments in a high quality
product. It has also been pointed out that cooperative members as small agricultural producers
in general have little interest in long-run investments, but rather focus on immediate payments
(see Iliopoulus and Cook, 1999). When intermediaries are competing for input goods, this may
put pressure on the transfers paid to primary producers, but at the same time reduce incentives
to invest in long-run e¢ ciency.
Karantininis and Zago (2001) present a model, which is close to ours, as producers of a raw
commodity can decide to deliver to a cooperative or an IOF. While they assume Cournot competi-
tion for the raw commodity and perfect competition in the nal goods market, our intermediaries
post a price to be paid per unit for the input and compete à la Cournot in the downstream market.
This means that as competition for the input is of a Bertrand type, in some scenarios rents are
shifted from the intermediary to the suppliers. Furthermore, intermediaries in our model have an
incentive to prevent their rival from acquiring any input, in order to improve their own position in
the Cournot competition.
Concerning our benchmark scenario, the paper of Es½o et al. (2010) is similar in that rms
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compete for a scarce input and have to pay a per unit price. They show that the endogenously
determined market structure allows for asymmetry in the sense that there is one large capacity-
hoarding rm. However, while the transfers paid are uniform take-it-or-leave-it type of o¤ers by
the IOFs in our model, capacity is auctioned at its marginal valuation in their model.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: section 3.2 discusses the model as-
sumptions. Section 3.3 develops the benchmark scenario of two competing IOFs, while section 3.4
follows with the IOF/Coop game. Section 3.5 discusses some of our assumptions, while the nal
section concludes.
3.2 Model
Consider a mass of N upstream rms (e.g., farmers or suppliers). Each supplier, indexed k,
produces one unit of a homogenous input at marginal cost normalized to 0. Further, there are
two downstream rms i 2 I = fA;Bg (e.g., processing rms or intermediaries). Each upstream
rm exclusively supplies one of the downstream rms, which transform the input one-to-one into
a homogeneous nal good for distribution to consumers.14 The downstream rm A is an investor-
owned rm (IOF), while the downstream rmB is either an investor-owned rm or a supplier-owned
cooperative. In contrast to the investor-owned rm, the cooperative intends to maximize the prot
of its members, i.e., its prot divided by its number of suppliers.
The downstream rms face an inverse demand function P (X) with P 0(X) < 0, where X denotes
the total quantity supplied in the downstream market and xi the quantity supplied by rm i: X =P
i2I xi: The downstream rms each incur processing cost C(xi) with C
0(xi) > 0 and C 00(xi) > 0
as well as a xed cost f > 0. To avoid the endogenous foundation of various small cooperatives
and guarantee a pure mixed duopoly, it has to hold that f > f = C(xM )   2C(xM=2), with xM
being the quantity produced by a regular monopoly, which faces demand P (xi) and production
cost C(xi).
The downstream rms compete for the supply by the upstream rms. That is, they o¤er
a non-discriminatory transfer ti for each unit of input and announce the maximum number of
14The described industry structure corresponds, for example, to the structure of the dairy and meat-packing
industry in Europe and North America. In Germany for instance, both investor-owned and cooperative dairy rms
oblige their suppliers to sell their entire capacity to them (see Bundeskartellamt, 2009, p. 74). In other countries,
this holds at least for cooperatives (Regulation (EU) No. 261/2012, para. 7).
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suppliers ni  N they are willing to accept for delivery.15 Transfer ti may be conditional on rm
is prot in the downstream market. Given the contract o¤ers, the upstream rms decide, which
downstream rm they prefer to supply. Each downstream rm then obtains ni  ni units of input
with ni 2 [0; N ] and
P
i2I ni  N , from a market maker, which distributes suppliers according to
their preferences.
We model the interactions between the players as a three-stage game, where all information is
public and all assumptions are common knowledge:
 First, the downstream rms simultaneously o¤er a correspondence ti for each unit of input
delivered by the upstream rms and announce the maximum number of suppliers ni  N
they will accept for delivery.
 Second, upstream rms decide, which downstream rm they prefer to supply. Each down-
stream rm i acquires capacity ni  ni from the market maker.
 In the last stage of the game, the downstream rms compete in quantities, given their capacity
constraints, i.e., choosing a quantity xi  ni.
Following our assumptions, the prot of each downstream rm is given by:16
i(xi; xj ; ) = P (X)xi   C(xi)  niti   f (3.1)
For later reference, we denote the prots net of xed cost and cost of capacity as follows:
ei(xi; xj) = P (X)xi   C(xi) (3.2)
Due to f > 0, we get a minimum capacity, which is required for a rm to make zero prots. In
order to denote this capacity for rm j 6= i, given rm is supply choice, we write:17
nj

xi
:= min
n
nj j ej(xi; xj = nj) = fo (3.3)
15This assumption reects the usual trading conditions in agricultural markets, where the processors and the
suppliers agree on a basic input price per unit, which can be adjusted by quality parameters and other factors like
transportation costs.
16Note that we omit arguments, where it does not lead to any confusion.
17The minimum capacity is the same for a cooperative and for an IOF, despite di¤erent objective functions.
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Finally, upstream rm ks prot, when delivering to downstream rm i, is given by:
ki(xi; xj ; ni) = ti(xi; xj ; ni) (3.4)
Using subgame perfection as our solution concept, we solve the game by backward induction.
We rst analyze the benchmark case of two investor-owned rms competing with each other. We
then turn to the case of a mixed duopoly, where a cooperative competes with an investor-owned
rm. We use the comparison of these scenarios to determine the e¤ects a cooperative has on (i)
the supply in the downstream market and (ii) the prots of suppliers. We illustrate these e¤ects
in an example using a linear demand and quadratic cost functions.
3.3 Benchmark: IOF vs. IOF
Downstream Competition. In the last stage of the game, the intermediaries choose their
quantities to be supplied to consumers. Each rm plays its best-response to the other rms
quantity decision. Hence, we get the standard Cournot result whenever the rms are not capacity
constrained. We denote these standard Cournot quantities by xC .18 The intermediaries may also
choose their output such that their respective capacity constraint is binding, while they decide to
supply nothing, if their production capacity does not exceed ni:
Xi (ni; xj) =
8><>: minf
eXi; nig, if ni  nijxj
0, else
(3.5)
with: eXi := argmax
xi
ei(xi; xj)
eXi denotes rm is best response function, if it did not face a capacity constraint. The quantity of
rm i, if it were to act as a monopoly, can be written as:
XMi (ni) := X

i (ni; 0) (3.6)
18Thus, xC is each intermediarys equilibrium quantity, if both play their Cournot best-responses, given demand
P (X) and cost function C(xi).
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As mentioned, we use xM to denote the standard monopoly quantity:
xM := argmax
xi
ei(xi; 0)
Delivery Decisions. When deciding upon which rm to contract with, the suppliers simply
maximize their prot. Given 8i : ti  0, they le a preference for one of the intermediaries, while
willing to supply the other intermediary, in case the preferred one has reached its desired capacity:
deliver to
8>>>><>>>>:
i if ti > tj and ni < ni
j if ti > tj and ni = ni
to either rm with Pr = 12 if tA = tB and 9i : ni < ni
(3.7)
A market maker then distributes the suppliers to rms i and j according to the supplierspref-
erences and the downstream rms o¤ers from the previous stage, anticipating the equilibrium
strategies in downstream competition. The decision described in (3.7) simply states a dominant
strategy, which imposes that suppliers prefer to contract with the rm, which pays the higher
transfer. If both rmstransfers are the same, i.e., suppliers being indi¤erent, the market maker
chooses either rm with probability 1=2.19
Contract O¤ers. In the rst stage of the game both downstream rms make their contract
o¤ers (ti; ni). We impose the following strategy to be part of an equilibrium:
ti =
8><>:
ei(Xi ;xj)
ni
; if ei(Xi ; xj) < Ci N
0; otherwise
(3.8)
ni = N
with Ci

N
being the Cournot prot for a given market capacity N dened as
Ci

N
:=
8><>:
ei  N2 ; N2  , if N < 2xCei  xC ; xC , otherwise (3.9)
This transfer payment is conditioned on the rmsprots in the downstream market. Whenever
19Note that there exist multiple capacity combinations for an equilibrium. However, we are only interested in
aggregate choices, as these determine the intermediariescapacities.
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rm i earns less than the Cournot prot for a given capacity N , all of its downstream prot is
shared equally among rm is suppliers. If the downstream prot matches the Cournot prot, the
suppliers get a transfer of 0, which is equal to their marginal cost.
This strategy is only feasible, if it holds that N is su¢ ciently large such that Ci

N
 f , which we
denote by
NC = min

N j eiN
2
;
N
2

= f

For smaller N , we get that rms compete for upstream capacity, transfering all downstream prots
to the suppliers. Thus, if N < NC , rms make a prot of 0 and suppliers get
ti =
ei (N; 0)  f
N
However, in such a case it still holds that X = N .
Proposition 3.1 If N  NC and f su¢ ciently small, the actions specied in (3.5), (3.7) and
(3.8) constitute an equilibrium of the IOF/IOF game.
Proof. See Appendix.
In this equilibrium downstream rms are able to use their contracts with the suppliers to prevent
any prot from being shifted upstream. Hence, the contracts enforce a collusive agreement of the
downstream rms vis-à-vis the suppliers. Deviation from the equilibrium would only be desirable
for rm j, if it allowed to increase its capacity, leading to a decrease of rm is capacity. This
induces a decrease in is prot such that, according to (3.8) rm i would pay all of its remaining
prot to its suppliers. In order to receive additional capacity rm j has to at least match rm
is transfer. Thus, it would become very expensive for the deviating rm, to acquire additional
capacity. The most protable way to deviate from this equilbirium is by trying to become the
monopoly in the downstream market. However, if f is su¢ cently small, deviation from (3.8) is not
protable, as the required transfer would have to be paid to many suppliers, in order for rm j to
become a monopoly.
While (3.8) leads to zero prots for the suppliers, supply in the downstream market is at least as
high, as in the corresponding Cournot game:
X = min

N; 2xC
	
(3.10)
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According to the indi¤erence condition specied in (3.7), production capacity is split equally be-
tween the intermediaries, as is the nal goods output.
There exist multiple equilibria for the competition between two investor-owned rms. We focus
on the equilibrium presented above as there exists no equilibrium, where the downstream rms earn
higher prots for given N . Note that intermediaries are not able to collude vis-à-vis the consumers.
For instance an equilibrium with half of the "monpoly prot" ei(xM2 ; xM2 ) instead of C as the
benchmark for the conditional payment, is not an equilibrium. As soon as N > xM , in the last
stage of the game, where the capacities are already set, each intermediary would be playing a best
response to a competitor playing x
M
2 , such that
eXi(xM2 ) > xM2 . For N  xM , intermediaries make
half of this "monopoly prot" anyway. Thus, the best they can do is the Cournot prot specied
in (3.9) at 0 cost of capacity.
We take this payo¤ dominant symmetric equilibrium as our benchmark case for the comparison
with the equilibrium outcome of the case where an IOF competes with a cooperative.
3.4 Mixed Oligopoly: IOF vs. Coop
As in the previous section, rm A is an IOF, maximizing its prot according to (3.1). However,
rm B is now assumed to be a supplier-owned cooperative, which distributes its prot net of
transfers, i.e., P (X)xB   C(xB)  f , equally among its suppliers. Accordingly, tB corresponds to
the individual suppliers share of the cooperatives prot:
tB(nB ; ) = P (X)xB   C(xB)  f
nB
(3.11)
While its transfer is xed, the cooperative may still decide on its maximum number of suppliers
nB in the rst stage of the game. As before, we analyze the game by using backward induction,
starting with the quantity decisions of the nal stage.
Downstream Competition. The supply decisions are analogous to (3.5). Again, intermedi-
aries either supply all the capacity, which they have bought from the upstream rms or they hold
excess capacity by selling a quantity eXi < ni, with eXi being the Cournot best response to the
decision of the other intermediary.
Delivery Decisions. Based on the contract o¤ers by the downstream rms, the upstream rms
decide, which downstream rm they prefer to supply according to (3.7). Again, this determines
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the distribution of capacity to the downstream rms, i.e., the realizations of nA and nB .
Contract O¤ers. In the rst stage of the game, the downstream rms make their contract
o¤ers to the suppliers. The cooperatives transfer scheme is exogenously given: all members of the
cooperative get an equal share of the cooperatives net prot, i.e., tB as noted in (3.11). The IOFs
o¤er, however, depends essentially on the availability of upstream capacity, N . If N is su¢ ciently
large, the IOF may choose to acquire the capacity, which is not demanded by the cooperative, at a
price of 0. If instead capacity is rather scarce, the cooperative might want to acquire all available
capacity, giving the IOF an incentive to compete for capacity. In this case the IOF needs to o¤er
the suppliers at least the average prot of the cooperative. As the cooperative by denition shifts
all prot from the downstream market to the suppliers, the IOF has to do so as well in order to
be able to compete for capacity. However, using the following results, we can restrict the types of
equilibria for this section.
Lemma 3.1 There exists no equilibrium of the IOF/Coop game with 0 < Xi < ni;8i 2 I.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition to this is as follows: Assume Xi < ni. Then, an increase of ni has no impact
on the rms own output choice since Xi = eXi < ni is the best response to Xj . Additionally,
by increasing its capacity, rm i cannot a¤ect the competitors quantity Xj , if the competitor
is also holding excess capacity, i.e., Xj < nj . At least for cooperative members, whose prot is
determined by prot sharing, excess capacity is always costly. Therefore, the cooperative has no
incentive to hold excess capacity, whenever the investor owned rm does.
Lemma 3.2 There exists no equilibrium of the IOF/Coop game with XA = nA > 0 and nB 
XB > 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Assume that the cooperative chooses a best reply to the IOFs quantity. If the cooperative then
decides, how much capacity to leave to the IOF, it has to weight the reduction in revenue from
allowing the IOF to supply a strictly positive quantity downstream and the reduction in cost from
reducing its own output and capacity. As long as the demand function is su¢ ciently steep and not
too concave, the reduction in revenue is larger than the cost benet. Then, the cooperative would
rather keep the IOF from entering the market by choosing nB  N   nA.
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Considering the best responses in (3.5), we are left with two types of equilibria:
i) 0 < XA < nA and 0 < X

B = nB
or
ii) Xi = 0 and 0 < X

j  nj
The rst type of equilibrium is the Cournot-type equilibrium of the IOF/Coop game, while the
second type is the monopoly equilibrium.
To discuss the di¤erent market structures for di¤erent capacities N and the corresponding
contract o¤ers, we start at N = nj

xi=0
and increase N until the Cournot-type equilibrium of the
IOF/Coop game. Therefore, we dene the following critical capacities:
In order to cover the xed cost f , any rm j needs to acquire a minimum capacity, given rm
i chooses a quantity of 0.
We denote this minimum capacity by N = nj

xi=0
.
If the cooperative is a monopoly in the downstream market, the IOF supplies a quantity of 0.
Then, the number of suppliers that maximizes the prot of the cooperatives members is given by:
XMB = argmax
nB
e(nB ; 0)  f
nB
(3.12)
We denote the rst critical N by N c1 = XMB .
It is straight forward that an unconstrained monopoly would choose a higher supply, as soon
as N > XMB , as due to the di¤erent objective functions it holds that:
xM > XMB (3.13)
We denote the second critical N by N c2 = xM + nj

xi=xM
. For the remainder of this section, we
assume that f is su¢ ciently small, such that xM > XMB + nAjxB=XMB .
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In a duopoly of the IOF/Coop game, we get that the cooperative chooses its optimal capacity,
20A discussion of this assumption is presented in part C of section 3.5.
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given the IOF will play a Cournot best-reply to that choice:
nB() = argmax
nB
e(nB ; eXA(nB))  f
nB
(3.14)
Such a Cournot duopoly is possible as soon as N is su¢ ciently large, which requires N  nB +eXA(nB). However, to be part of an equilibrium the average prot from mainting the monopoly
position must be smaller or equal than in the Cournot duopoly:
tB(x
M ; 0; N   nAjxB=xM )

N
 tB

nB ; eXA(nB); nB
N
(3.15)
As tB(xM ; 0; N  nAjxB=xM ) decreases, while tB

nB ; eXA(nB); nB is constant in N , we can guar-
antee that there exists an N , such that these transfers are equal.
We denote the nal criticalN byN c3 = max
n
N j tB(xM ; 0; N   nAjxB=xM ) = tB

nB ; eXA(nB); nBo.
Lemma 3.3 If N 2 N;N c1, the intermediaries compete for a monopoly position with total
supply in the downstream market X = N .
The cooperative allows at least as many suppliers to be members as are necessary in order to
maximize the average prot. Supply is equal to its capacity, i.e., XB = N < N
c1, as
@tB(N; 0; N)
@N

N<Nc1
> 0
Lemma 3.3 implies that the IOF has to o¤er a transfer to the suppliers, which equals at least the
cooperatives average prot. Otherwise, all suppliers will supply the cooperative. Hence, there
exist two equilibria with either the cooperative or the IOF supplying N .21
Lemma 3.4 If N 2 N c1; N c2, the intermediaries compete for a monopoly position with total
supply in the downstream market X = N   en with en = minfN  XMB ; njxi=Xg.
If N increases to N 2
h
N c1; XMB + nAjxB=XMB

, the cooperative can still prevent market entry
of the IOF by acquiring its optimal quantity XMB . This is due to the residual capacity in the
21As noted in the introduction, it is quite frequently stated in the literature that IOFs are more e¢ cient than
cooperatives. In our model, if the IOF is more e¢ cient than the cooperative, there exists only one equilibrium with
the IOF acquiring capacity from all N suppliers at a price equal to the cooperatives maximized average prot, i.e.,
tB(nB). In this case, the IOF would still be able to make positive prots, despite matching the cooperatives o¤er
for the transfer.
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market, i.e., N  XMB ; being smaller than the minimum capacity the IOF needs to cover its xed
cost. Again, the IOF can mimic the cooperatives behavior, which implies that both rms compete
for the monopoly position in the market.
For N 2
h
XMB + nAjxB=XMB ; N
c2

; the downstream rms also compete for a monopoly. The
cooperative is willing to accept a quantity of N nA to prevent market entry by the IOF, although
this exceeds the quantity, which maximizes the average prot, i.e., XMB . Assume N = X
M
B +
nAjxB=XMB + ". If the cooperative would allow the IOF to enter the market, the IOFs quantity
would be xA = nAjxB + ". Due to the e¤ect on the price the reduction of tB would therefore be
larger then in case XMB + " suppliers were allowed to be part of the cooperative. As the average
prot is decreasing in the number of suppliers, if nB > XMB , the cooperative does not accept more
than N   nA. The o¤er by the IOF has to be at least as good as the cooperatives in order to
attract suppliers.
The following corollary to lemma 3.4 holds for any N 2  N c1; N c2.
Corollary 3.1 If N 2  N c1; N c2, total output in the IOF/Coop game is lower than the quantity
supplied by a regular monopoly.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition is that as the regular monopoly has its maximum at xM , it would supply as
much as possible until N = xM . The rms in the IOF/Coop game have to maximize the average
prot and thus have their maximum at XMB < N . Therefore, they want to acquire only as much
capacity, as is needed, to keep the other rm out of the market, and thus ni = N   en with
en = minfN   XMB ; njxi=Xg > 0. Therefore, as X < N < xM + njxi=xM , total supply in the
IOF/Coop game is lower than the supply of a regular monopoly, if N 2  N c1; N c2.
If N increases beyond N c2, there is more capacity available than any type of monopoly would
want to acquire.
Lemma 3.5 If N 2 N c2; N c3, the intermediaries compete for a monopoly position with total
supply in the downstream market X = xM .
Lemma 3.5 represents another ine¢ ciency compared to the IOF/IOF game in section 3.3,
where X = N until N = 2xc. In the IOF/Coop game a monopoly can still hold its position by
acquiring N   nj

xi=xM
units of capacity. As before, nj

xi=xM
are uncontracted, but in addition
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N   nj

xi=xM
  xM units of capacity are acquired by the monopoly, but not used for production.
If N increases, this implies that while the prot in the downstream market stays constant, it has
to be distributed among a larger number of suppliers. Thus, the supplierstransfer decreases until
it is benecial for the suppliers to give up the monopoly position and allow competition in the
downstream market.
Lemma 3.6 If N  N c3, the intermediaries do not compete for the delivery by the suppliers.
Total supply is constant at X = nB + eXA(nB).
If N is su¢ ciently large, the cooperative acquires a number of suppliers that maximizes its
membersprots, given the IOF will play a best response to that in the Cournot game. In the nal
stage of the game, the cooperative will sell exactly what it purchases from the upstream suppliers,
i.e., XB = nB as it holds that
@ tB(X

B ; X

A; nB)jXB<nBxM
@nB
< 0
The number of suppliers that maximizes the cooperatives average prot and, thus, the prot of
the cooperatives members is now given by (3.14). The IOF wants to acquire enough capacity in
order to play its best-response to the capacity choice of the cooperative. Due to suppliersmarginal
cost being equal to 0, the IOF can acquire as much capacity as is left by the cooperative (N  nB)
for a price of tA = 0. Hence, the IOFs capacity decision for large N is nA = N , with N   nB
suppliers providing their capacity to the IOF.
Proposition 3.2 The actions specied in (3.5), (3.7) and lemma 3.3 to 3.6 constitute an equi-
librium of the IOF/Coop game, with total supply being smaller or equal than in the IOF/IOF
game.
To better illustrate this result, we apply an example with a linear inverse demand function
P (X) = 1 X and quadratic cost functions for the downstream rms C(xi) = x2i =10. As mentioned,
the suppliersmarginal cost of production are normalized to zero. The xed cost of downstream
rms are assumed to be f = 0:02 > f  0:01; which also satises that xM > XMB + nAjnB=XMB .
Figure 3.1 shows total supply X as a function of available capacity N in both scenarios. The
upper (red or dashed) function is the total supply in the benchmark case of two IOFs competing,
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Figure 3.1: Total supply X(N) in the IOF/IOF (dashed) and the IOF/Coop (dotted) game.
while the lower (blue or dotted) function shows total supply in case one of the intermediaries is a
cooperative.
N 2 N;N c1: Both scenarios lead to the same total supply X = N . Note that in this interval the
cooperative is more e¢ cient than two IOFs, as the monopoly only has to bear the x cost once,
while the duopoly structure of the IOF/IOF game has to incur these costs twice.
N 2 N c1; N c2: We still get X = N in the IOF/IOF game, while X = N   en in case rm B
is a cooperative. Thus, in this range some capacity remains unsupplied due to the cooperative
maximizing its membersprots and the IOF being at best able to mimic this behavior by the
cooperative.
N 2 N c2; N c3: Supply in the IOF/Coop game is constant at X = xM , while in the IOF/IOF
game X = N until intermediaries change to regular Cournot quantities with X = 2xc at N < N c3.
Thus, in the IOF/Coop game the active intermediary is longer able to maintain a monopoly
position. As N   nj

xi=xM
> xM , some capacity is bought by the monopoly, but remains unused.
N  N c3: Intermediaries in the IOF/Coop game play a duopoly solution with X = nB + eXA(nB),
which is less than supply in the Cournot solution of the IOF/IOF game, where X = 2xC .
Thus, in our model consumers are better o¤ in the scenario of two IOFs competing with each
other as supply is less or equal, if one of the intermediaries is a cooperative.
Figure 3.2 shows the transfer received by suppliers. As in the IOF/IOF game transfers are
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Figure 3.2: Transfer tB(N) paid by the cooperative to suppliers.
equal to 0 except for very small N , upstream rms are of course better o¤, if one of the rms is a
cooperative. Thus, we can conrm the cooperative to have a competitive yardstick e¤ect for prices
of primary products. However, the benet of being a member of the cooperative depends on the
number of suppliers N .
N 2 N;N c1: The transfer paid to suppliers is the industry prot of a monopoly o¤ering all
available capacity, divided by the number of suppliers.
N 2 N c1; N c2: Up to N c2 the individual transfer is reduced, as the additional contribution to
the cooperatives prot diminishes, but it has to be shared equally.
N 2 N c2; N c3: As the regular monopoly quantity xM is reached, the output quantity and the
downstream prot stay constant, but more suppliers have to be contracted, in order for the active
intermediary to remain the monopoly. Hence, each suppliers share of the prot is further reduced.
N  N c3: If the intermediaries compete à la Cournot, the cooperative distributes its prot among
its suppliers, while the IOF pays a transfer of 0. As the Cournot quantities and corresponding
production capacities are constant, the transfers are constant as well.
3.5 Discussion
Our results are based on two main assumptions concerning the structure of the model. We rst
discuss these assumptions and then turn our attention to the hitherto assumed restriction on the
xed cost parameter f .
A) Separated downstream markets: We assume that both the input as well as the nal
products are homogenous. However, if we allow nal products to be di¤erentiated, the changes
in the models dynamics are straight forward. The more the nal goodsmarkets are separated,
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the less the intermediariesincentives to keep the rival out of the market, as rm is output has
less impact on rm js demand. For illustrative purposes, consider the most extreme case of fully
di¤erentiated downstream markets. Then intermediaries will simply try to acquire enough capacity
to supply their monopoly quantity.
In the IOF/IOF game the equilibrium proposed in proposition 3.1 still holds. The supply in each
market is
X = min

N
2
; xM

which is of course less than the supply in a single and homogenous product market, but total
supply of both IOFs is equal or larger than that.
However, in case one of the rms is a cooperative, the ine¢ ciency depicted in corollary 3.1 vanishes,
if markets are fully di¤erentiated.22 If N  XMB , intermediaries have to compete for capacity such
that the whole industry prot will be transferred to the upstream rms. If N > XMB , the IOF can
either take the residual capacity nA = N   XMB at cost of 0 or compete for additional capacity.
The IOF would have to pay the maximized average prot to all suppliers to get additional capacity,
and thereby at best make a prot of 0. Thus, any nA > nA at cost of 0 leaves the IOF better
o¤ and we get one market with X = min

N;XMB
	
and one with X = min

N  XB ; xM
	
. An
ine¢ ciency still created by the cooperative, compared to the IOF/IOF game, is that its market
gets less supply than in case of a regular monopoly, as due to its prot sharing rule XMB < x
M .
Furthermore, as only one of the markets gets any supply until N = XMB the loss of consumer
surplus is larger than if the supply is split equally like in the IOF/IOF game.
B) Discriminatory transfers to suppliers: The second assumption, which is to be dis-
cussed, is that transfers, which are paid to suppliers, are non-discriminatory. This assumption
makes it as expensive as possible for the IOF to become a monopoly, as the cooperatives transfer
would have to be paid to all contracted suppliers; even to those, who are not able to join the
cooperative and have therefore opportunity cost of 0 to supply the IOF.
As we follow the literature in having the cooperative share all its prots equally among its mem-
bers, we do not vary this assumption for the cooperative. If the IOF can make bilateral agreements
with suppliers, some form of sequential procedure is required instead of the simultaneous o¤ers in
the model above. The way, in which the sequentiality is structured, may have an important impact
22For intermediate ranges of product di¤erentiation this ine¢ ciency result still holds, but to a lesser extent.
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on market outcomes. An e¤ect, which can be generally expected from relaxing this assumption, is
that the cost of capacity for the IOF decreases. This can lead our ine¢ ciency result from corollary
3.1 to be weakened or even vanish. As compared to non-discriminatory transfers the total cost
of producing an additional unit (production plus capacity cost) decreases, the IOF might be able
to contract all suppliers in order to choose a higher output.
However, for large N , we still get an ine¢ ciency in the Cournot-type equilibrium due to the lower
supply by the cooperative compared to an IOF.
C) Increasing xed cost f : For the exposition in section 3.4, we have assumed f to be
su¢ ciently small to guarantee
xM > XMB + nAjnB=XMB : (3.16)
To satisfy condition (3.16) with linear demand P (X) = a   bX and a quadratic cost function
C(xi) = cx
2
i , we get that
f  bf = a2  3b2 + 6bc+ 4c2   bp5b2 + 12bc+ 8c2
8(b+ c)(b+ 2c)2
; (3.17)
which is increasing in a and decreasing in b and c.23
However, if (3.17) is violated, we get that xM < XMB + nAjnB=XMB . Then, it holds that
XMB  xM < XMB + nAjnB=XMB : (3.18)
Avoiding negative prots leads to a maximum f of
f =
a2
4(b+ c)
. (3.19)
Clearly f > bf and thus, if
bf < f  f
we get that in equilibrium a monopoly cooperative would choose the same output as a regular
monopoly xM . Up until N = xM , it is also the same output as total output in section 3.3. If
N > xM two competing IOFs would still choose X = N; while in the IOF/Coop game the single
23Analysis of (3.17) shows that it is satised for a lot of parameter constellations, as long as f is su¢ ciently close
to f .
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monopoly leaves its output at X = xM . Hence, the ine¢ ciency in corollary 3.1 vanishes. However,
consumers are still worse o¤, as forN > xM total output remains lower than in the case of two IOFs.
3.6 Conclusion
In this model, we have shown that the possibility of suppliers to join a cooperative can lead to
an ine¢ ciently low supply by downstream rms. This is due to the fact that the contracts o¤ered
by the cooperative raise the cost for the input good or production capacity in such a way that
total supply can be even less than the quantity supplied by a regular monopoly. Such an e¤ect is
not present in our benchmark case of two IOFs competing. Thus, the presence of a cooperative,
while increasing the average transfer received by the suppliers, can reduce consumer surplus due
to lower supply. While the literature on cooperatives and mixed oligopolies tends to highlight
the rst aspect of increased rents for suppliers, we claim that when the e¤ects of cooperatives
are evaluated also in respect to exemptions made in competition law the negative e¤ect on
consumer surplus needs to be taken into account as well.
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3.7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1. It is straight forward that (3.5) and (3.7) are part of an equilibrium.
With (3.8), the intermediaries are able to acquire their full Cournot prots, even if the number
of suppliers N is small. For this proof it holds that N 2 NC ; 2xC. If N > 2xC , intermediaries
could acquire some additional capacity for free, but would not want to use it anyway. Hence,
the incentives to acquire additional capacity are larger, if N  2xC . If N < NC only one of the
intermediaries may be active and they compete for the available capacity.
Assume that rm j wants to deviate by acquiring a capacity bn > N2 . For the deviation prot b()
it has to hold that
b(Xi ; xj)  f   bn bt > C   f
to be protable. Rearranging for bt leads to
bt < b(Xi ; xj) Cbn . (3.20)
As bn > N2 leads rm i to make a downstream prot ei(Xi ; xj) < C , rm is transfer is
ti =
ei(Xi ; xj)
ni
as it sticks to the equilibrium strategy in (3.8). As the market maker can distribute suppliers to
the rm, which pays a higher transfer, rm j has to match rm is o¤er, in order to acquire a
capacity bn > N2 . Thus, we get that bt  C
N=2
(3.21)
Combining (3.20) and (3.21), we get that deviation is only protable, if
b(xi; xj)
C
> 1 + 2
bn
N
.
Therefore, a deviation to increase capacity such that bn = N2 +" and "! 0 is clearly not protable.
However, if rm j wants to be the monopoly in the downstream market, it needs bn = N  nijxj=xM ,
which leads to
M
C
> 3 
nijxj=xM
N
.
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This cannot be the case, as long as f is su¢ ciently small. For example, to allow deviation with a
linear demand function P (X) = a  bX and strictly convex cost function C(xi) = cx2, we get that
f >
a2(b+ 2c)2
16(b3 + c+ 3bc(b+ c))
.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Assume that eXi < ni;8i, then @XA=@nB = 0. As nB > eXB leads to
@XB=@nB = 0; we get @tB=@nB < 0. Thus, we cannot have an equilibrium, in which both rms
hold excess capacity.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. According to (3.5), there is a best response for the cooperative XB =eXB(nA) < xM for any XA = nA  nAjxB=XB . Given the IOF will choose its capacity as its
output and the cooperative will play a best response to that, we can nd the optimal quantity left
to the IOF from the cooperatives persepective. We will show in two steps that, given the IOF will
choose XA = nA, the cooperative does not want the IOF to enter the market.
While the cooperative maximizes tB , we use that as N = nA+nB , tB can also be maximized with
respect to nA, by choosing the appropriate nB . Further, we use that (i) the rst order condition
of tB with respect to nA is negative at nA = nAjxB=XB and (ii) that, if we can identify a solution
of the rst order condition, the second order condtion of tB with respect to nA shows that this
solution is not a maximum.
(i) Evaluated at nA = nAjxB=XB+" for "! 0, the cooperatives rst order condition, with respect
to nA is
@tB(X

B ; nA; N   nA)
@nA

nA=nAjxB=XB
=
eB(XB ; 0)  f + N   nAjxB=XBXBP 0(X)
N   nAjxB=XB
2 .
Thus, in order for it to be negative, it has to hold that
XB

P (XB) + P
0(X)

N   nAjxB=XB

  C(XB)  f < 0,
which is clearly negative, if
P (XB)
N   nAjxB=XB
<  P 0(X),
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which requires the demand function to be su¢ ciently steep.
(ii) Given tB is maximized with respect to xB and nA, the second order condition for the latter is
d2tB(X

B ; nA; N   nA)
dn2A

nA=nA
=

P (X)  C 0( eXB(nA))2 + eXB(nA)3C 00( eXB(nA))P 00(X)
(N   nA)2 eXB(nA)2
In case of linear demand P 00(X) = 0, we get that d
2tB
dn2A
> 0, and nA not being a maximum. Thus,
the maximum of tB with respect to nA has to be a corner solution. As nA = N leads to tB = 0,
the maximum has to be at nA = 0. If P
00(X) < 0, it just needs to be su¢ ciently large.
Thus, whenever P 0(X) is su¢ ciently small and P 00(X) is su¢ ciently large, we cannot have an
equilibrium, with XA = nA > 0 and X

B =
eXB(nA) > 0. This also holds for the case that
XB = nB > 0, where the cooperative has even less of an incentive to leave any capacity to the
IOF.
Proof of Corollary 3.1. As for the regular monopoly it holds that
0(x)jx<xM > 0 and 00(x) < 0
the monopoly would choose X = N , if N 2  N c1; N c2. However, as rms in the IOF/Coop game
have to maximize the average prot, they need to take into account that
@tB(X

B ; 0; nB)
@nB

nB>XMB
< 0 and
@tB(xB ; 0; nB)
@xB

xB<nB<xM
> 0.
Thus, while supplying all the quantity that they acquired, downstream rms would choose the ca-
pacity as low as possible, which is in this case nB = X = N en with en = minfN XMB ; njxi=Xg >
0.
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4 Information Acquisition in Vertical Relations
4.1 Introduction
Uncertainty about demand is a general phenomenon in markets for new products or in markets,
where consumer preferences vary over time, e.g., markets for fashion goods. Similarly, exogenous
demand shocks can lead to price uctuations and thus expose rms to high economic risks. In-
formation obtained from market research can reduce the rmsuncertainty. In supply chains the
question arises whether suppliers and/or retailers want to acquire information about market de-
mand. There are two main strategic issues involved: First, suppliers can use the contracts they
o¤er to signal their private information. Second, retailers can increase their information rent, if
they reduce their uncertainty.
We analyze a simple model with one supplier, one retailer and uncertainty about demand in
a perfectly competitive market. The uncertainty is modelled as uncertainty about the price, at
which the retailer can sell the suppliers product and which might be either high or low. The
supplier and the retailer receive private signals about the price of the product. The precision of
these signals, i.e., the probability with which they signal the actual price, can be chosen by each
of the players. Although the signals themselves are private, we assume that the choices on signal
precision are observable. The supplier o¤ers contracts to the retailer, which each specify a certain
quantity and transfer. The contracts may depend on the suppliers private information, which has
a signalling e¤ect towards the retailer. The retailer chooses one of the o¤ered contracts, given his
own private signal, and sells the respective quantity at the actual market price.
In this model we focus on the analysis of the agents incentives to acquire information. We
show that there are two kind of equilibria: one where only the retailer decides to get informed
and one where both the supplier and the retailer choose to increase the precision of their signals.
The rst type of equilibrium is due to the fact that contracts, which credibly signal the suppliers
private information to be a high price signal, are costly in the sense that the supplier has to distort
the quantities he o¤ers. Comparing the implied signalling cost with the potential gains from
appropriating some of the retailers information rent, the supplier decides to remain uninformed
as long as the retailers signal precision and thus his information rent is su¢ ciently small. By
contrast and related to the second type of equilibrium, the supplier will choose to be informed, if
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the retailers information rent is su¢ ciently high, i.e., if the retailers signal precision is su¢ ciently
high. Furthermore we show that the information decisions of supplier and retailer are strategic
complements such that they reinforce each other.
There is a vast literature on principal-agent models with endogenous information acquisition.
Kessler (1998) analyzes an agents incentive to get informed before the contracting stage. This
paper shows that it is not optimal for the agent to become perfectly informed as this would reduce
the expected information rent. Considering the principal Bedard (2013), Kaya (2010) and Nosal
(2006) show that acquiring information may not be valuable for the principal as it leads to signalling
costs in the contracting stage. Our model replicates this result as we show that the incentives of
the principal to get informed depend on the information the agent has. The better the agent is
informed the higher are the incentives of the principal to get informed as well as this allows him
to appropriate the agents information rent. Crémer et al (1998) as well as Crémer and Khalil
(1994) examine the incentives of a principal to induce an agent to acquire additional information.
In contrast to our model they assume that information gathering takes place after the principal
has designed the contracts he o¤ers, but before the agent decides, which contract to sign. We
follow Kessler (1998) and Kaya (2010) by assuming that decisions about information acquisition
are made prior to the contracting stage and that these decisions are observable. However, we allow
both players to gather information and focus on the strategic interdependencies of these decisions.
The literature on information gathering within a supply chain can be classied in terms of who
acquires the information and how the information is used within the supply chain. Guo and Iyer
(2010) analyze the case, in which an upstream manufacturer can gather information on consumers
perceived product t. They observe that the manufacturer does not have an incentive to be fully
informed even if it is free of charge. This correlates with one of our equilibria where the supplier
does not want to be informed. However, they model the information stage in another way. The
information acquisition takes place after contracting with a retailer and is a¤ected by di¤erent
information sharing mechanisms.
In contrast to this, there are several papers, which consider a downstream retailer/ buyer investing
in forecasting of demand or other uncertain parameters. Shin and Tunca (2010) show that if
there is competition between retailers, the incentives of these retailers to invest in information
acquisition are such that overinvestment occurs. If the investment is secret the overinvestment
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can be resolved by market based contracts, while in case of observable investments an uniform-
price auction is required to solve that issue. Closer to our model is the structure in Fu and Zhu
(2010), where a single retailer acquires costly demand information after contract negotiations, but
before ordering quantities. In their model, the added information might lead the informed party
to improve its prots at the suppliers expense. They suggest a sharing mechanism for the cost
and the information in order for the added information to lead to a Pareto-improvement. Guo
(2009) addresses the question of forced versus voluntary disclosure of information and the e¤ects
of the disclosure rules on the rmsprots. It is shown that while forced disclosure actually harms
the informed retailer and benets the uninformed supplier, voluntary disclosure might restore the
retailers incentives to get informed in the rst place.
Treating a similar problem, Kurtulus et al (2011) allow both the supplier and the retailer to invest
in more accurate information about demand. They focus on potential prot losses implied by
production decisions of the supplier and either too low or high orderings of the retailer. The aim
of their paper is to analyze the benets of information sharing, i.e., of common demand forecasts
by the supplier and the retailer. For this purpose Kurtulus et al (2011) consider risk sharing based
on buy back clauses.
The papers above do not analyze whether the decisions on information acquisition are strategic
complements or substitutes. Barlevy and Veronesi (2000) look at a nancial market and show that
learning can be a strategic complement. This contradicts Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), who show
that learning is a strategic substitute. However, both papers only take a horizontal relation into
account. The model in this chapter contributes to the literature, as it considers a comparative
static analysis of the information decision in a supply chain and explains the existence of two
di¤erent types of equilibria.
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 is concerned with the model framework.
In section 4.3, we characterize the equilibrium contracts o¤ered by the supplier for any given
combination of private signals and precision choices. The decisions on information acquisition
are analyzed in section 4.4. Section 4.5 presents a discussion of some of the models structural
assumptions. Finally, section 4.6 concludes.
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4.2 Model
We consider a three stage game with one supplier, one retailer and uncertain market conditions. In
the rst stage both players i 2 fS;Rg can simultaneously choose the level of precision of the private
signals about the actual market condition. While the selected signal precisions are observable, the
signals themselves are private information. In the second stage, the supplier designs a menu of
contracts, which he o¤ers to the retailer. Then, the retailer chooses one of the contracts and o¤ers
the respective quantity on the market. The prot of the supplier is the transfer paid by the retailer
minus the cost of producing the quantity specied in the contract, which has been chosen by the
retailer. The retailers prot is this quantity times the market price for the good, minus the transfer
paid to the supplier.
The retailer faces a perfectly competitive market. To capture uncertainty about market condi-
tions, we assume that the market price for the product is p 2 fpL; pHg with pH = 1, pL =  and
1=2 <  < 1.24 We further assume that the commonly known probabilities for the high and the
low price are
Prfp = 1g = Prfp = g = 1
2
Allowing for di¤erent prior probabilities would complicate the analysis without leading to qualita-
tively di¤erent results.
At the end of the rst stage both players get private signals i 2 fH;Lg about the actual
market price. Each player i may choose his signal precision i 2 [1=2; ] with 1=2 <   1, without
any cost.25 The probabilities for getting a correct signal are given by
i = Prfi = Hj p = 1g = Prfi = Lj p = g
Correspondingly, the probabilities for getting a wrong signal are given by
1  i = Prfi = Hj p = g = Prfi = Lj p = 1g
Note that i = 1=2 implies that rm i is completely uninformed. As mentioned, we assume that
24Note that our results also hold in case of a strictly concave industry prot and the uncertainty relating to a
shift in the demand curve.
25 < 1 corresponds to assuming a convex cost function for information acquisition with lim!1 C() =1.
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S and R are observable while the signals themselves are private information.
Turning to the second stage, the supplier chooses the menu of contracts that he o¤ers. Each
contract entails a xed payment T and a quantity x, which is produced by the supplier at a cost
of
C(x) =
1
2
x2
Since we assume that this decision takes place after the supplier has received his private signal,
the o¤ered menu can be conditioned on the suppliers signal S
CS = (CHS ; CLS ) = ((THS ; xHS ); (TLS ; xLS )) with S 2 fH;Lg
If S = 1=2, the suppliers signal is not informative. Then the contracts he o¤ers do not depend
on S and correspond to pooling contracts, which do not signal any private information. On the
other hand, S > 1=2 leads to separating contracts CH 6= CL which in turn allows the retailer to
update his beliefs about the state of demand. More precisely, given signal S and the corresponding
contract o¤er CS , the conditional probability that signal R = k reects the true state of the
world k 2 fH;Lg can be written as
RS = Pr(p = pkjR; S) =
8><>:
RS
(1 R)(1 S)+RS , if R = S
(1 S)R
S(1 R)+(1 S)R , if R 6= S
Our solution concept is the Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. To decrease the potentially high
number of equilibria we make the following additional assumptions: O¤ equilibrium the retailer
assumes that the suppliers signal is S = L. Following the intuitive criterion we further assume
that menu o¤er CH induces the retailer to belief S = H, only if the supplier would not be better
o¤ by o¤ering CH than CL, if his signal was L.
In the next section, we characterize the equilibrium contracts. We then turn to the suppliers
and retailers decisions on signal precision in the rst stage of the game.
4.3 Equilibrium Contracts
We start with the case in which the signal of the supplier is S = L and then turn to S = H.
If S = L, the supplier o¤ers CL = (CHL; CLL). The expected prot of the retailer, if he chooses
45
contract (TkL; xkL) with k 2 fH;Lg, can be written as26
ERLL(CkL) = (1  LL)xkL + LLxkL   TkL, if R = L
ERHL(CkL) = HLxkL + (1  HL)xkL   TkL, if R = H
Since ERHL(CHL) and E
R
LL(CLL) satisfy the single crossing property, the binding constraints
for the optimal incentive compatible contracts CHL and CLL are given by
ERHL(CHL) = E
R
HL(CLL) and E
R
LL(CLL) = 0 (4.1)
The expected prot of the supplier given his signal was S = L can be written as
ESL(CL) = (1  S)

R

THL   1
2
x2HL

+ (1  R)

TLL   1
2
x2LL

(4.2)
+ S

(1  R)

THL   1
2
x2HL

+ R

TLL   1
2
x2LL

Maximizing (4.2) subject to (4.1) we get:
Lemma 4.1 The optimal menu CL = (C

HL; C

LL) is characterized by
xHL = + HL(1  )
xLL = +
"
1  LL  
S ((1  S)R   (1  S)(1  R))
(SR + (1  R)(1  S))2
#
(1  )
and
ERHL(C

HL) = (HL   (1  LL))(1  )xLL
Proof. See appendix.
Note that quantities xHL and x

LL entail the standard result of an optimal quantity for the
"high type", i.e., R = H, and a downward distorted quantity for the "low type", i.e., R = L.
While a retailer with R = H is able to make prot ERHL(CHL)  0, a retailer with R = L is
left with 0 prot as it is depicted in (4.1).
26To simplify notation, we omit the exogenous parameter , as well as endogenous variables, which can be taken
as given at the respective stage of the game.
46
With S = H, the supplier o¤ers CH = (CHH ; CLH) and the retailers expected prots are
given by
ERLH(CkH) = (1  LH)xkH + LHxkH   TkL, if R = L
ERHH(CkH) = HHxkH + (1  HH)xkH   TkL, if R = H
Again, the single crossing property holds and the binding constraints are given by
ERHH(CHH) = E
R
HH(CLH) and E
R
LH(CLH) = 0 (4.3)
The expected prot of a supplier with S = H can be written as
ESH(CH) = S

R

THH   1
2
x2HH

+ (1  R)

TLH   1
2
x2LH

(4.4)
+ (1  S)

(1  R)

THH   1
2
x2HH

+ R

TLH   1
2
x2LH

In contrast to the case with S = L, o¤ering CH has to be credible, i.e., observing CH the retailer
must be convinced that the suppliers signal was S = H. Credibly signalling S = H increases
the retailers belief that p = 1 and thus his willingness-to-pay. To ensure credibility the menu CH
has to satisfy the following constraint
(CH ; C

L) := E
S
L(C

L)  ESL(CH)  0 (4.5)
Comparing (4.3) and (4.5) shows that there exists a unique eR(S ; ) 2 (0; 1] such that (4.5) is
binding only for R  eR(S ; ). Thus, we have:
Lemma 4.2 The optimal contracts CH = (C

HH ; C

LH) are characterized by
xHH = + HH(1  ) and xLH =
8><>: bx

LH , if R  eR(S ; )
bxLH +LH , if R  eR(S ; )
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Note further that we have CH 6= CL, if S 6= 1=2 and limS!1=2(CH CL) = 0. Thus, S = 1=2
leads to pooling contracts, which do not require the additional distortion to solve the suppliers
credibility problem. On the other hand S = 1 resolves all uncertainty for the supplier, but still
requires additional distortion to credibly signal S = H to a retailer, who is less then perfectly
informed.
4.4 Choice of Signal Precision
Turning to the rst stage of the game, the expected prots of the supplier ES and the retailer
ER can be written as
ES(S ; R) =
1
2
ESH(C

H) +
1
2
ESL(C

L) (4.6)
ER(R; S) =
1
2
((1  R)(1  S) + RS)ERHH(CHH) (4.7)
+
1
2
((1  S)R + S(1  R))ERHL(CHL)
Regarding the shape of these prot functions, we get the following result for the retailer:
Lemma 4.3 A solution R(; S) such that
@ER(R(; S); S)
@R
= 0 and R(; S) < eR(S ; )
only exists, if S is su¢ ciently small. Furthermore, the retailers marginal incentives for informa-
tion acquisition have a downward kink at R = eR(S ; ), i.e.,
lim
R%eR(S ;)
@ER(R; S)
@R
> lim
R&eR(S ;)
@ER(R; S)
@R
:
Finally, we have @ER(R; S)

@R < 0, if ; R; S are such that xLH = bxLH = " with " > 0
but small.
Proof. See appendix.
The rst part of the lemma implies that for S = 1=2, the retailers best response is not to be as
informed as possible. This is simply due to the fact that the downward distortions of the quantities
xLL and x

LH are increasing in R which impacts the retailers expected prot negatively. The
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second part of lemma 4.3 indicates that eR(S ; ) may be part of an equilibrium, if the kink of
ER(R; S) is such that its left side is upward, while the right side is downward sloping. The
nal part guarantees that the retailers best response never leads to bxLH = 0, as the retailer would
rather reduce the precision of his signal in order to prevent such an extreme distortion.
Turning to the supplier, we get:
Lemma 4.4 The suppliers incentives for information acquisition are characterized by
@ES(S ; R)
@S

S=1=2
< 0 for R < 1 and
@ES(S ; R)
@S
> 0 for S and R su¢ ciently high.
Furthermore, ES(S ; R) is strictly convex in S for all R; S such that xLH > 0.
Proof. See appendix.
Lemma 4.4 guarantees by convexity of ES(S ; R) that the supplier either chooses to get
not informed at all or as much as possible. Intuitively, starting with S = 1=2 an increase in
S forces the supplier to reduce xLH in order to satisfy the credibility constraint, which o¤sets
any potential gains from being better informed. If S and R are su¢ ciently high, the credibility
constraint is not binding and the supplier can fully benet from signalling his information. Thus,
if R > eR(S ; ), the supplier has an incentive to be as informed as possible.
Combining lemma 4.3 and 4.4, we can formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 4.1 Suppose  = 1. Then, there exist multiple equilibria with S = 1 and 

R
su¢ ciently high:
Proof. See appendix.
If  = 1, i.e., if players can choose to be perfectly informed, the supplier is able to extract the
entire rent from the retailer by choosing S = 1 and the appropriate contracts. Thus, E
R(R; 1) =
0, while for the supplier it holds that
ES(1; R) =
2R   1 + 2
4R
> 0
If we restrict  < 1, the analysis of the equilibrium choices S and 

R is more involved since we
have to distinguish whether R is lower or higher then eR(S ; ). Furthermore, we now get that
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two types of equilibria may coexist.
Proposition 4.2 Assume  < 1. Then, there exist 1(); 2() 2 (1=2; 1) and two types of
equilibria characterized by:
i) If   1(),
S =
1
2
and R = min f0R; g
with 0R being the solution to @E
R(R; 1=2)

@R = 0:
ii) If   2(),
S =  and 

R = minfmaxfeR(; ); 00Rg; g
with 00R being the solution to @E
R(R; )

@R = 0 for xLH = bxLH
Proof. See appendix.
The proposition states that depending on the maximum precision  we either get an equilib-
rium, where the supplier decides to stay uninformed, or an equilibrium, where the supplier wants
to be informed as much as possible. The two types of equilibria show two di¤erent strategies for
the supplier to cope with the credibility problem discussed above. When the retailer is not able to
get well informed ( low), the supplier can refuse to get informed at all, as the distortion from the
retailers information is low and the credibility problem can thus be avoided by o¤ering pooling
contracts. When the retailer can get well informed ( high), the information rent is relatively
high. Therefore, it is benecial for the supplier to o¤er separating contracts, despite the required
additional distortion of xLH .
The graphs of 1() and 2() are shown in Figure 4.2. Note that we have 1() > 2() for
 su¢ ciently small, while ES(1=2; R ) = E
S(; R ) and 

R =  lead to 1() = 2() for
 su¢ ciently high. Note also that for su¢ ciently small , both types of equilibria exist. This is
due to the complementarity of the decisions on signal precision. Consider for example  = 0:79
and two di¤erent values of . With  = 1=2 we get 0R = 3=4 < 

R = : As  is small, the
e¤ect of R on the quantities is large and a high R would thus imply highly distorted quantities
xLk; k 2 fH;Lg. This leads the retailer to choose a low R. If the retailer chooses R = 0R, the
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4.5 Discussion
In this section, we discuss variations of three structural assumptions of our model. First, we allow
the supplier to get his signal veried and address the question, whether the supplier wants to
disclose his signal to the verication process. Second, we modify the game such that the supplier
designs the contracts before learning his private signal. Afterwards, the supplier receives his private
signal, which he may report to the retailer before the retailer chooses one of the contracts. Third,
we analyze the game when either the retailer or the supplier decides rst on the precision of their
signals. We retain our main assumptions about the observability of these decisions.
A) Veriable Signals: Assume that in contrast to the model above the suppliers signal is
veriable. Then as in the case of signals being public information the supplier does not face
the credibility problem, which is discussed above. This would lead to standard adverse selection
results in our model. Now further assume that there is a chance that the supplier did not receive
any signal and it is thus credible for him to pretend not to have received private information, even
if he did.
The credibility problem is now a di¤erent one. A supplier with an H signal would always want to
disclose his private information. As the signal can be veried a supplier with an H signal can o¤er
standard adverse selection contracts, as there is no additional credibility condition to be satised.
However, a supplier with an L signal would want to pretend to have not received any signal, as
the regular pooling contracts o¤er a higher prot, than the separating contracts, given an L signal
is revealed. This requires the pooling contracts, which are o¤ered by a supplier, who really did
not receive any signal to distort the quantity for a retailer with an L signal such that it is no
longer favourable for a supplier with an L signal to pretend that he did not receive any private
information. This additional distortion makes it credible for the supplier without a signal that he
did not receive an L signal. Thus, the supplier without a signal faces a similar problem as the
supplier with an H signal in our main model.
Concerning the suppliers decision to get informed, we nd that compared to the main model
he decides to stay uninformed for relatively high . This allows the supplier to avoid the risk of
receiving no signal, which would require him to o¤er distorted pooling contracts, while he can o¤er
regular pooling contracts, if he does not acquire any information.
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B) Contract Predesign: Assume that the supplier is allowed to design the contracts before
he learns his signal and can thereby commit to a specic menu of contracts. After the contracts
are xed and the supplier has learned his signal, he may report it to the retailer. We now have to
distinguish two cases.
First, assume that  is su¢ ciently small such that the information rent from being informed
is so small that the supplier does not have an incentive to get informed. Then, the supplier will
choose S =
1
2 and design pooling contracts as before. As the suppliers signal is not informative,
it does not matter, what he reports to the retailer.
Second, assume that  is su¢ ciently large such that the supplier wants to o¤er separating
contracts. To guarantee incentive compatibility, the supplier has to design 4 di¤erent contracts,
one for each possible combination of S and R. In order for the report of his signal to be credible,
the contracts have to be incentive compatible to the supplier in the same way, as in the model
above. However, as now the retailer has the possibility to choose from 4 instead of 2 contracts,
incentive compatibility for the retailer is harder to achieve. As the highest quantity contract CHH
remains undistorted, the supplier can only guarantee incentive compatibility by further distorting
the remaining contracts. Thus, he can never benet from designing the contracts before his signal
realization.
If, however, the supplier for some reason needs to do so, the range of  for which the supplier
prefers to o¤er pooling contracts is again larger than in the main model, as the incentive compati-
bility is more di¢ cult to achieve with separating contracts. For example, if  = 2=3, this leads the
supplier to o¤er only pooling contracts regardless of .
C) Sequential Decisions: Assume that the retailer selects the precision of his signal rst and
that the supplier observes this decision. Since the suppliers prot function is convex in S (see
lemma 4.4), he either chooses S = 1=2 or S = . Comparing the retailers prots for S = 1=2
and S =  reveals
ER(R; 1=2) > E
R(R; ) for all  > 1=2; (4.8)
which implies that the retailer wants to choose R such that it induces the supplier to choose
S =
1
2 . We can dene a critical 
c
R, with R  cR inducing S = 12 , whenever feasible:
cR = min

RjES(; R)  ES(1=2; R)  0; 
	
:
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Using the denition of R in proposition 4.2 we therefore get that in the sequential move game,
where the retailer decides rst, the equilibrium is characterized by RFS = 1=2 and 
RF
R =
minfR; cRg. Thus, the retailer prefers the pooling contracts, whenever feasible, as the sup-
plier can extract more rent, if he o¤ers separating contracts. In addition, the downward distortion
required to solve the suppliers credibility problem is avoided, if pooling contracts are used.
Now assume that the supplier decides rst on his signal precision. Using the retailers best
response SFR 2 fR; R g and analyzing the suppliers maximization problem, we get that in
the sequential move game, where the supplier decides rst, the equilibrium is characterized by
SFS = 1=2 for  and  su¢ ciently small; otherwise the supplier chooses 
SF
S = . The intuition is
analogous to the main model, where the supplier has to decide, if he wants to avoid the credibility
problem by choosing SFS = 1=2 or if he wants to solve it by distorting x

LH . In the latter case, the
supplier chooses SFS = . However, if  is su¢ ciently small such that 1() > 2() (as in Figure
4.2), the supplier is now able to select the equilibrium, which he prefers. In our model this leads
the supplier to choose SFS = 1=2. Thus, if the supplier decides rst, pooling contracts are o¤ered
more often.
4.6 Conclusion
We have analyzed the incentives of a supplier and a retailer to acquire more accurate informa-
tion about actual market conditions. Using a simple model we show that choices on information
acquisition are strategic complements and that the supplier chooses to get informed, only if the
information of the retailer is su¢ ciently precise even though the cost of information acquisition is 0.
If the maximum signal precision is su¢ ciently high, the retailers information rent from acquiring
additional information is relatively high as well. Thus, the supplier has stronger incentives to get
informed as well and appropriate some of the information rent. If the maximum signal precision
is su¢ ciently small, the retailers information rent is rather small too. Thus, it becomes more
attractive for the supplier to solve the credibility problem, which he faces, if he receives a signal
for a high price, by not being informed and choosing pooling contracts.
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4.7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4.1 Solving ERHL(CHL) = E
R
HL(CLL) and E
R
LL(CLL) = 0 for THL and
TLL, substituting in ESL(CHL; CLL) and maximizing with respect to xHL and xLL leads to the
stated results.
Proof of Lemma 4.2 Solving ERHH(CHH) = E
R
HH(CLH) and E
R
LH(CLH) = 0 for
THH and TLH and substituting in ESH(CHH ; CLH) we get
@ESH
@xHH
=
1  R   (1  2R)s
R + (1  2R)S
@
@xHH
(CH ; C

L)
Hence, the optimal quantity xHH is given by
xHH = + HH(1  )
Turning to xLH assume rst that with xHH = xHH the constraint (CH ; C

L)  0 is not binding.
Then, @ESH

@xLH = 0 leads to bxLH .
Turning to the question whether (CH ; CL)  0 is binding, we use CL, xHH and dene
xLH := bxLH +LH :This allows us to write (CH ; CL) as
(CH ; C

L))jxHH=xHH = (S ; R; ) 
(1  2R)2S(1  S(3  2S))(1  )
(R + S   2RS)2(1  S   R(1  2S))LH
  1
2
[1  S   R(1  2S))]2LH
where (S ; R; ) is given by
(S ; R; ) = E
S
H(CH)

xHH ; xLH=bxLH  
(2R   1)3(1  S)22S(1  2S)(1  )2
2(R + S   2RS)4(1  S   R(1  2S))2 :
Solving (S ; R; ) = 0 for R shows that there exists a unique solution eR(S ; ) 2 [1=2; 1] and
that
(S ; R; ) Q 0() R Q eR(S ; ):
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To determine the optimal quantity xLH for R < eR(S ; ), note that
@
@xLH

ESL(CL)  ESL(CH)

xLH=bxLH < 0 and
@2
@x2LH

ESL(CL)  ESL(CH)

= (1  2R)(1  2S) > 0
Furthermore, note that
@2ESL(CH)
@x2LH
=  S   R(1  2S) < 0
Therefore we have that ESL(CH) as well as (CH ; C

L) are symmetric around their maximum
and minimum respectively. While there are two values for LH , which satisfy (CH ; CL) = 0, we
choose the one, which puts less distortion on xLH . As it can be shown that
argmin
xLH
(CH ; C

L) > argmax
xLH
ESL(CH),
we know by symmetry of the functions that the optimal distortion LH is given by
LH = min
n
LH
(CH ; CL)jxHH=xHH ;xLH=bxLH+LH = 0o
Hence, it holds that xLH < bxLH , whenever R < eR(S ; ).
Proof of Lemma 4.3 The rst part of the lemma follows from solving @ER(R; S)

@R =
0 with xLH = bxLH + LH for S as a function cS(R; ). Numerical calculations show that
cS(R; ) attains its maximum at R  0:83 and  = 1=2 and that this maximum is given
by cS(0:83; 1=2)  0:625. Hence, for S > 0:625 there exists no solution R(; S) such that
@ER(R(; S); S)

@R = 0 and R(; S)  eR(S ; ).
The second results follow from evaluating @ER(R; S)

@R for R % eR(S ; ) using xLH =
bxLH +LH and for R & eR(S ; ) using xLH = bxLH . This leads to
lim
vR%eR
@ER(R; S)
@R
> 0 and
lim
R%eR(S ;)
@ER(R; S)
@R
> lim
R&eR(S ;)
@ER(R; S)
@R
:
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The nal part of the lemma can be proved by solving bxLH = 0 for R which leads to
cR =
S(1 + S   3(1 + S)) 
p
(1  S)S
p
(1  )(S(5  S(1  ) + 3)  4)
2( 1 + 2S)(S   (1  S)) :
Substituting into @ER(R; S)

@R reveals
lim
vR%cR
@ER(R; S)
@R
< 0:
Proof of Lemma 4.4 The rst two results follow from evaluating @ES(R; S)

@S
and xLH = bxLH +LH for S = 1=2 and xLH = bxLH for R > eR(S ; ). Numerical calculations
show that ES(R; S) is strictly convex in S as long as xLH > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4.1 Starting with the retailer, note that
xLH = bxLH +LH for S = 1 and ER(R; 1) = 0:
Considering the supplier, we get
ES(1; R) > E
S(S ; R) for all S 2 [1=2; 1)
as long as R is such that
2 + 42R(3  (5  2))  (2R + 10v3R)(1  )2  1,
which can be guaranteed by R > 0:708 for all values of . According to lemma 4.1 and 4.2, the
quantities in an equilibrium with S = 1 are x

LL = x

HL =  and x

HH = 1 and are undistorted,
while the credibility problem still leads to distortion in xLH , which is
xLH jS=1;R<1 = 1 
p
R   2R
R
.
Still, if R = 1 as well, it also holds that x

HH = x

LH .
Proof of Proposition 4.2 Using lemma 4.4 we can prove the rst part of the proposition
by comparing the suppliers prots for S = 1=2 and for S =  respectively taking into account
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the optimal decision of the retailer. Consider rst S = 1=2. Then, @ER(R; 1=2)

@R = 0
leads to
0R =
5
12
+
1
6(1  )
and
R = min f0R; g ,
as well as
ES(1=2; R) =
1
2
(2 + 52R (1  )2   (2  )  2R(3  (5 + 2))):
Solving ES(1=2; R) = E
S(; R) for  leads to 1() and the graph shown in Figure 4.2.
Turning to second part of the proposition, the retailers best response R = minf;maxfeR(; ); 00Rgg
is determined by whether eR(; ) or 00R are feasible and by
lim
R&eR(;)
@ER(R; )
@R
8><>: < 0) 

R = eR(; )
> 0) R = 00R
Numerical calculations show that ER(R; S) is strictly concave in R as long as R  eR(; )
and that @ER(R; )

@R is strictly positive for all R  eR(; ) and S  2() (see also the
proof of lemma 4.3). Hence, the best response of the retailer is given by R .
Considering the supplier, lemma 4.4 implies that the suppliers best response is either S = 1=2 or
S = . Solving
ES(
1
2
; R ) = E
S(; R )
for  leads to 2() shown in Figure 4.2.
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